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Michael Walzer suggests that our common beliefs about individual responsibility and liability
become largely irrelevant in the conduct of war. In conditions of war, everything is changed.
Political realists have claimed that war eliminates morality; Walzer claims that war collectivizes
it. I believe that conditions of war change nothing at all; they simply make it more difficult to
ascertain relevant facts. This is not to say that the principles and laws that do or should govern
the activity of war are identical to those governing relations among individuals. Just as domestic
law cannot simply restate the principles of individual morality, because the declaration and
enforcement of laws have effects that must be taken into account in the formulation of the law,
so too the principles, conventions, and laws of war cannot simply restate the principles of
individual or international morality. The rules of war have to accommodate our epistemic
limitations and to be formulated with a regard for the ways in which their announcement is
likely to affect people’s behavior. But they should otherwise reflect as closely as possible the
same principles of justice and liability that govern conduct outside of war.
Walzer offers various challenges to the elements of this individualist approach to war. He
suggests, for example, that this position is really only a closet version of collectivism. When I
claim that, during the Gulf War, Iraqi units composed of conscripts ought to have been treated
differently from the Republican Guard, Walzer contends that I am thereby accepting the
erasure of individual moral identity, though only at the divisional level, whereas the tradi-
tional view accepts the collectivization of moral identity at the less arbitrary level of the
military as a whole. I do not, however, accept collectivization at any level. No Iraqi soldier’s
moral status or liability was determined by his membership in the Republican Guard or by his
being a conscript. The difference in treatment required by my position is instead grounded in
the necessity of acting on the basis of reasonable presumptions. Just as I may reasonably
presume that the person pointing a gun in my direction and shouting threats is a potential
murderer, even if he is in fact an actor so deeply absorbed in rehearsing his role as a murderer
that he has failed to notice my presence, so an American soldier in the Gulf War was entitled
to presume that any member of the Republican Guard was culpably defending a wrongful
aggression, even if he had in fact been coerced to join the Guard by his family and was
privately resolved to fire over the heads of American soldiers, and so posed no threat at all.
What should we say when, as in these cases, a reasonable presumption turns out to be
mistaken? I think it is reasonable to accept an objective account of justification and
therefore to conclude that I act wrongly, though perhaps with a fully exculpating excuse, if I
kill the actor whom I reasonably believe to be a murderer. We should also conclude that if a
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were all culpable, his action may nevertheless be objectively disproportionate if some of the
unjust combatants are morally innocent.
It might be thought that how we classify these acts is unimportant given that the
knowledge required to act in the objectively right way is unavailable at the time of action.
That may be right; but my point in contrasting the Republican Guard with a conscript unit
was to show that we sometimes have information that shifts the presumption we are entitled
to make. One point of contention between Walzer and me is whether reasonable
presumptions about the moral responsibility of enemy combatants for the threat they pose
is relevant to how they should be treated. Walzer thinks not. His view is that in war a
person is liable to attack by virtue of posing a threat and that a combatant’s status is
‘collectivized’ in that he counts as posing a threat simply by being a member of the military.
I claim, by contrast, that moral responsibility for an unjust threat is the criterion of liability
to attack in war and that, while virtually all unjust combatants are morally responsible for
posing an unjust threat, some are more responsible than others and the degree of their
individual liability varies with the degree of their responsibility. I of course concede that
reliable information about the degree of an individual’s moral responsibility is virtually
never available in conditions of war. But this does not mean that a combatant’s liability is
collectivized; it means that soldiers must act on the basis of presumptions of liability. But
these presumptions may vary from one context to another.
Walzer goes on, however, to question whether issues of individual responsibility can
ever be of practical moral significance in war. His skepticism is directed primarily at the
supposition that matters of individual responsibility can be relevant to how combatants may
treat other combatants. While I think that judgments of individual responsibility are perhaps
of greatest importance when made by individual combatants about their own action, I will
follow Walzer in focusing on how a combatant’s moral responsibility affects what other
combatants may do to him. Walzer challenges my suggestion that judgments of individual
responsibility were relevant to the conduct of the Gulf War. What would I have said, he
asks, to American soldiers if I had had to explain to them that the proportionality restriction
was more stringent in its application to attacks on conscripts in the regular army than in its
application to attacks on the Republican Guard whose flank the regular army was
protecting?
Let me make this easier on myself by focusing on an example in which the diminished
responsibility of combatants is more salient than it was among Iraqi conscripts. Suppose I
were a commander in the field facing an army of child soldiers, children ranging from 10 to
15 years of age who have been abducted from their families, brutalized, and indoctrinated
and who are now fully armed, drugged, and therefore utterly fearless. There are such
armies. And the child soldiers who compose them have combatant status according to
Walzer’s view and are therefore fully liable to be attacked and killed. If they are morally
innocent, or lack moral responsibility for the threat they pose, that is, on Walzer’s view,
wholly irrelevant to what it is permissible to do to them. But here is what I would say to
those combatants under my command.
You’re aware that we sometimes have to adjust the level of our firepower to take proper
account of the status of our targets. If, for example, we knew that enemy forces had
taken neutral civilians hostage and were using them as shields, we might have to employ
lesser force than we otherwise would in order to minimize the harm we would cause to
the civilians. We might, indeed, have to fine-tune our level of force in relation to the
number or proportion of civilians present among the enemy combatants. We now con-
front an army of children. They’re as dangerous as adults would be – indeed more so
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because of the drugs they’ve been given. But they’re also victims of those who’re ex-
ploiting them. They’re scarcely responsible at all for what they’re doing. We should do
what we can to spare them. Take additional risks, if necessary, to try to drive them back
without injuring them, or to incapacitate, subdue, or capture them rather than kill them.
I suspect that a commander who uttered these words to his troops would earn their
respect rather than finding his words received with incredulity or scorn. Nor would it be
absurd to address similar remarks to combatants confronting an army of conscripts who had
been driven from their homes and onto the battlefield by threats against their families.
Walzer also claims that judgments of individual responsibility should make no difference
to the treatment of captured soldiers. Again I disagree, though matters are more complicated
here for reasons that Walzer implicitly recognizes in his claim that “the surrender
convention is a reciprocal agreement that is obviously of benefit to both sides. But it also
fits nicely with the ‘traditional’ argument about the moral equality of soldiers.” The
suggestion here is that the moral equality of soldiers is more than merely conventional,
more than a matter of agreement for mutual advantage. Thus, the treatment of prisoners is
governed simultaneously by a convention that has evident utility and by considerations of
individual rights and liabilities that are not matters of convention.
While the convention applies without regard to questions of individual responsibility,
that is not true, I believe, of nonconventional considerations of rights and liability. Suppose,
for example, that we have captured enemy combatants on our own territory. They are
mercenaries who were promised booty as a reward for participation in an aggressive
campaign to seize our oilfields and other natural resources. We learn that the aggressor is
sending a massive force to the area in which we are now located. We must evacuate. If we
release our prisoners, they will rejoin the enemy army. But if we take them with us, they
will hinder our movement, diminish our already depleted stores of food, and divert our
attention to the prevention of their escape, and may attempt to alert the enemy to our
location. They will, in short, significantly increase the risks we will face in our efforts to
evade the enemy. These prisoners have thus, through their own voluntary and wrongful
action, put us in a position in which we must either kill them or expose ourselves to a
significantly increased risk of being killed. I believe that considerations of justice would
permit us to kill them in these circumstances. They have made themselves liable to be killed
by wrongfully making it the case that our sparing them would increase the peril to our own
lives. Yet we also, as I have conceded, have moral reason to abide by the conventions
governing the treatment of prisoners, both for our own sake in the future and for the sake of
any of our fellow soldiers who are being held prisoner by the enemy. How these opposing
considerations balance out in the end depends on the details of the case.
But now imagine that our prisoners are not mercenaries who have participated in unjust
aggression for reasons of self-interest but are instead morally innocent conscripts who were
both lied to by their government and coerced to fight by threats against their families. In
that case their responsibility for the dilemma we face would be minimal and we would have
decisive conventional and nonconventional moral reasons not to kill them, even in the
circumstances I have described.
Walzer contends that international courts are yet another arena in which judgments about
the individual moral responsibility of combatants are out of place. He contrasts the
individual trials of Dutch citizens accused of collaboration with the Nazis with our refusal
to try individual German or Italian soldiers for participation in campaigns that we regard as
uncontroversial instances of unjust aggression. His explanation of why the Dutch trials
were appropriate while trials for unjust combatants would not have been appeals to a
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particular form of excuse that was available to the soldiers but not to the collaborators. Each
soldier could truthfully have said: “Everyone else was doing just as I did and our conduct
had the sanction of the moral authorities in our society: the government, the clergy, and so
on. I can’t be held liable in such circumstances for failing to perceive or act on what I can
only now perceive to have been the right moral reasons.”
It is true that most unjust combatants have this excuse while collaborators and other
traitors do not and indeed cannot. (If collaborators had this excuse, the collaboration would
be so widespread as to constitute submission and assimilation and there would be no need
for or possibility of later trials. What would remain as the object of treachery if everyone
had joined the enemy? Who would there be to try the traitors if virtually everyone were a
traitor?) But there had better be more to the explanation of why it was appropriate for the
Dutch to try their collaborators while it would not have been appropriate for the Allies to
have tried German and Italian soldiers. For when crime is serious enough, the claim that
‘everyone else was doing it’ is very unlikely to be exculpating. I think that is so in the case
of the German and Italian soldiers. In the aftermath of the war, most of these soldiers had
ample reason to experience not just what Bernard Williams calls “agent-regret” but also
guilt. Even when they had restricted their use of force to Allied combatants, they had served
political goals that were evil and abhorrent and had killed people simply for attempting to
defend their lives, their families, and their political independence.
The reason why it was not appropriate to try these soldiers is not that there were no
moral crimes of which they were guilty, nor that they shared a fully exculpating collective
excuse. The reasons are instead pragmatic. For example, while there is considerable risk of
injustice and vengeance even in domestic trials of collaborators, the risk is far greater when
victors try defeated foreign enemies. There are, moreover, far too many of the latter to be
tried with any prospect of fairness. There are also pragmatic reasons not to threaten
combatants with punishment ex ante: for example, that the prospect of punishment, or
vengeance under cover of punishment, would make the termination of war more difficult by
giving soldiers in the field an incentive to continue to fight rather than to surrender.
Recognition that there are these objections to the post bellum punishment of unjust
combatants is fully compatible with the position I have defended. For these objections do
not appeal to the moral equality of soldiers or to the collectivization of moral status in war
but to considerations of an entirely pragmatic nature.
Walzer concludes his critique by challenging the practical relevance of my notion of
noncombatant liability. He concedes that if we had precision-guided warmonger-seeking
missiles, some traditional just war theorists might allow their use in residential areas. But
since this is fantasy, my view will not, he suggests, diverge from his own in matters of
practice, except perhaps with respect to the stringency of the constraints that each of us
would recognize on targeted killing.
But again I suspect that there are more substantial divergences. Suppose that there are
two military targets in enemy territory that are of equal strategic importance but that we
have the resources to destroy only one. Neither can be attacked, however, without civilian
casualties and the number of casualties would be roughly the same in either case. One target
is located in a government stronghold, where people are in general ethnically, religiously,
and politically aligned with the government and exert a powerful influence over its
decisions, including the decision to launch this unjust war against us. The other is located in
an area populated by an ethnic minority whose members are in open revolt against the
government and its war. If moral responsibility for an unjust threat is irrelevant to liability,
as the traditional theory asserts, it should make no difference morally which target we
attack. Yet I believe that, given that we can attack only one of the targets, it would be wrong
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to attack the target in the area populated by dissenters – and perhaps that is true even if an
attack on that target could be expected to cause fewer casualties than an attack on the other.
(Again, this is not because individual liability is collectivized. It is because it is reasonable
to presume of each person in the disaffected area that he or she bears less responsibility for
the government’s action than a corresponding person in the government stronghold.) There
are, moreover, other types of case that raise the same issue – for example, a case in which
one possible target is in the center of enemy territory, while the other is on the border.
Assuming an attack on each would cause civilian casualties, it does not seem a matter of
moral indifference whether the civilians harmed are citizens of the enemy country or
citizens of the adjacent neutral country. For it is a reasonable presumption that most citizens
of the enemy state bear some degree of responsibility for that state’s action, while most
citizens of the neutral state bear none at all.
Walzer believes that what he calls the war convention is just an adaptation, developed
over many centuries, of our ordinary morality to the circumstances of war. But again I have
doubts. The traditional theory of the just war, as manifested in the war convention, seems
much more like an adaptation to the circumstances of war of a Hobbesian vision of the right
of self-defense combined with various elements of chivalric morality. Indeed, what my
paper sought to demonstrate is precisely the incompatibility between certain central
elements of the traditional theory and our ordinary beliefs about moral liability to defensive
force. I have argued, for example, that our criteria of liability imply that some civilians may
be morally liable to certain forms of harm (though not normally, as I stress in the paper, to
killing). In his jocular reference to warmongers, Walzer concedes that some traditional
theorists might accept this. But my point is that if they were to accept this, even if only for
hypothetical circumstances, they would have ceased to be adherents of the traditional
theory, which insists on the immunity of noncombatants. The traditional theory incorporates
the principle of noncombatant immunity not because it is a mutually beneficial convention
but because it is an implication of the theory’s own criterion of liability to defensive force.
According to the traditional theory, people become liable to attack by virtue of actively
posing a threat to others; thus, because noncombatants do not pose a threat, they cannot be
liable to attack. But this, I argue, is not what we in fact believe – not only about liability in
relations among individuals but even in the circumstances of war.
What I have proposed is that we explore with greater care and in greater depth the moral
foundations of the just war in, for example, the morality of individual self- and other-
defense in order to determine what those foundations properly imply about such matters as
liability to attack in war. Walzer is certainly right that in the end we must arrive at codes of
conduct and laws of war that are sensitive to the nature of war and that would, if
promulgated, mitigate rather than exacerbate the terrible effects of war. But I do not think
that we can know, in advance of inquiring, that the principles and laws that would constitute
the best compromise between our foundational convictions about justice and liability and
the necessity of having workable rules adapted to the complexities of war would turn out to
be, with perhaps minor modifications, the prevailing war convention that Walzer has
defended.
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